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ABSTRACT
A quantitative risk assessment model was developed 
to estimate the annual probability of introducing bovine 
viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and bovine herpesvirus 1 
(BoHV-1) at the farm level through animal movements. 
Data from 2017 official animal movements, biosecurity 
questionnaires, scientific literature, and expert opinion 
from field veterinarians were taken into consideration 
for model input parameters. Purchasing or introduc-
ing cattle, rearing replacement heifers offsite, showing 
cattle at competitions, sharing transport vehicles with 
other herds, and transporting cattle in vehicles that 
have not been cleaned and disinfected were considered 
in the model. The annual probability of introducing 
BVDV or BoHV-1 through infected animals was very 
heterogeneous between farms. The median likelihoods 
of BVDV and BoHV-1introduction were 12 and 9%, 
respectively. Farms that purchased cattle from within 
their region (i.e., local movements) and shared trans-
port with other farms had a higher probability for 
BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction. This model can be 
a useful tool to support decision-making on biosecurity 
measures that should be prioritized to reduce the prob-
ability of introduction of these 2 diseases in dairy herds.
Key words: biosecurity, bovine viral diarrhea virus, 
bovine herpesvirus-1, epidemiology, risk assessment
INTRODUCTION
Bovine viral diarrhea (BVD), caused by BVD virus 
(BVDV), and infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR) 
caused by bovine herpesvirus 1 (BoHV-1), are 2 
diseases of importance in dairy herds because of their 
effects on reproductive performance, increased suscep-
tibility to other diseases, early culling, and subsequent 
economic losses (Hage et al., 1998; Muylkens et al., 
2007; Newcomer and Givens, 2016). Animals infected 
by BVDV can be classified into 3 different infection 
statuses: (1) persistently infected (PI) cattle, which are 
animals vertically infected during early pregnancy (30 
to 120 d) and that shed large amounts of virus all their 
lives (Houe, 1999); (2) transiently infected (TI) cattle, 
which are animals horizontally infected after birth that 
shed small amounts of virus for up to 15 d (Houe, 1999; 
Niskanen et al., 2000); and (3) Trojan cows (TR), which 
are pregnant cows that carry a PI calf (Reardon et al., 
2018). Cattle with BoHV-1 can develop acute infections 
(AcI) and shed the virus for a short time, followed by a 
latent infection (LI) for the rest of their lives, excreting 
the virus under stress conditions (Lazic et al., 2003). 
Cattle movements are considered the main routes of 
BVDV and BoHV-1 spread between herds (van Schaik 
et al., 1998, 2002; Lindberg and Alenius, 1999).
Several European countries have implemented com-
pulsory and voluntary BVD and IBR control and eradi-
cation programs (Lindberg et al., 2006; Nardelli et al., 
2008). The implementation of biosecurity is considered 
an essential pillar in these programs. Different stud-
ies have described biosecurity measures in cattle farms 
(e.g., Sahlström et al., 2014; Sarrazin et al., 2014a), and 
several methods have been developed to score different 
levels of biosecurity practices implemented on farms. 
Existing methods to evaluate biosecurity practices use 
checklists to support the development of on-farm bios-
ecurity plans (https: / / www .farmbiosecurity .com .au) or 
to score the level of biosecurity measures implemented 
on farms based on measures that are common to the 
transmission of different types of infectious agents, 
such as Biocheck.UGent (Laanen et al., 2014). In ad-
dition, several studies have identified biosecurity gaps 
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as risk factors associated with disease outbreaks and, 
therefore, have provided relevant information for dis-
ease prevention (e.g., Almeida et al., 2013; Machado 
et al., 2016). However, less attention has focused on 
the development of risk assessment models to evalu-
ate the effect of biosecurity measures in the probabil-
ity of disease introduction to support decision-making 
on which practices should be prioritized according to 
farm-specific risks. Biosecurity programs need to be 
flexible and adaptable to the particular situations on 
each farm (Wells, 2000; Brennan and Christley, 2012). 
In this context, quantitative risk assessment (Murray et 
al., 2004) can be a useful method to identify and justify 
the enhancement of biosecurity measures based on the 
probability of disease introduction.
The aim of the present study was to develop a quan-
titative risk assessment model to identify farm-specific 
biosecurity measures that should be implemented to 
reduce the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 introduc-
tion into dairy cattle herds through animal movements.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data
A structured questionnaire was used to obtain data 
on biosecurity measures on 34 and 93 farms from Cata-
lonia and Galicia, Spain, respectively, that voluntarily 
participated in the project. The biosecurity question-
naire (available in Spanish upon request) was structured 
in 4 parts: (1) general data of the farm; (2) animal 
movements (e.g., origin of the animals, frequency of in-
troductions, test, quarantine facilities, external rearing 
farms, cattle fairs, pasture); (3) vehicles (e.g., vehicles 
entering inside farm perimeter, vehicles coming in with 
other animals); and (4) visitors and staff (e.g., external 
workers, frequency of visitors, use of protective cloth-
ing). The Autonomous Governments of Catalonia and 
Galicia provided records of cattle movements (national 
and international) for 2017. Movements were registered 
at the animal level and included the following informa-
tion: calving date, movement date, country of origin, 
and a unique code of destination. Based on the calving 
date and movement date, the age of each purchased 
animal was calculated. For BVDV, we classified intro-
duced cows and heifers into 1 of 3 groups: (1) <12 mo 
old, (2) from 12 to 24 mo old, and (3) > 24 mo old. 
Based on published reports, PI animals were classified 
into 1 of the first 2 groups, whereas TI animals could be 
classified into any group, and Trojan cows could only 
be classified into 1 of the last 2 groups. For BoHV-1, 
introduced cattle were classified into 1 of 2 groups (i.e., 
<24 mo, ≥24 mo) because disease prevalence can vary 
by age (Mars et al., 2001; Lassen et al., 2012; Sayers et 
al., 2015). The pregnancy status of introduced animals 
and an estimate of their days of gestation were provided 
for each study farm.
Risk Release Pathways
Field veterinarians responsible for the health man-
agement of farms involved in the project were invited 
to participate in the development of the risk assess-
ment model. One discussion group was organized to 
determine risk release pathways and risk-mitigating 
measures that should be included in the model. Five 
veterinarians attended a group discussion meeting (Ap-
pendix Table A1). After the group discussion, variables 
for introduction of new animals through purchase of 
cattle, movements of reared replacement heifers offsite, 
movements to cattle competitions, shared transport 
vehicles with others farms, and transport of cattle 
in vehicles that have not been properly cleaned and 
disinfected (i.e., contaminated transport vehicle) were 
considered for inclusion in the model. Movements to 
pasture were included in the biosecurity questionnaire 
but not considered in the model because it was not 
a common practice in dairy cattle in the area under 
study. In Figure 1, parameters considered in the path-
way for the “purchase of animals” are shown. Param-
eters considered for the movement of animals to cattle 
competitions and reared replacement heifers offsite are 
presented in Appendix Figure A1 and Figure A2.
Model Development
To estimate the probability of introducing BVDV 
and BoHV-1 into a dairy cattle farm in a 12-mo period, 
a stochastic risk assessment model was developed us-
ing the mc2d package (Pouillot and Delignette-Muller, 
2010) implemented in R (https: / / www .R -project .org/ ). 
Monte Carlo simulations (10,000 iterations) were 
performed, and all nonfixed input parameters were 
included as uncertain parameters.
Probability of Purchasing an Infected Animal
In the analysis, using the cattle movement database, 
the origins of cattle purchased from other farms in-
cluded France, the Netherlands, Catalonia, Galicia, and 
the rest of Spain. Accordingly, cattle movements were 
classified into 1 of these 5 origins. We assumed that the 
number of cattle purchased in each batch throughout 
the year had the same number of animals. Therefore, 
the number of animals purchased each time (i.e., the 
size of the batch) from each country/area, group age 
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and farm (data obtained from the biosecurity question-
naires) was calculated using equation [1] (Appendix 
Table A2).
The probability that at least one animal from a 
batch coming from a single farm of a certain country/
area was already infected with BVDV or BoHV-1 was 
estimated using equation [2] (Appendix Table A2). 
Herd and within-herd prevalence values were obtained 
through a literature review and personal contacts with 
experts from the countries. Values from Catalonia and 
Galicia were obtained from previous work conducted 
in these areas (Benavides et al., 2018). In the case of 
BVDV, herds with young cattle that tested seroposi-
tive or detection of the virus within cattle herds were 
considered indications that the virus was circulating in 
those herds.
In Table 1, the different input distributions used in 
the model are described. Probability distributions were 
used to account for uncertainty in parameter estimates. 
Uniform distributions were reported as minimum 
and maximum values, and they were used as inputs 
obtained from the literature (i.e., BVDV and BoHV-1 
prevalence, diagnostic test performance, BVDV trans-
mission probability). We used PERT distributions for 
BVDV survival in different materials where the mini-
mum, maximum, and most likely values were the time 
in hours that the virus could survive.
The expected numbers of BVDV and BoHV-1 animals 
already infected in the farm of origin were calculated 
based on the probability that a single animal was in-
fected, using equations [3.1] and [3.2] (Appendix Table 
A2). The expected number of uninfected animals for 
each age group was therefore obtained by subtracting 
the expected number of animals infected in each age 
group from the total number of purchased animals.
Probability of False Negatives
Based on group discussion with attending veterinar-
ians, animals were routinely tested for the detection 
of BoHV-1 and BVDV antibodies by using an ELISA 
before cattle purchase. Using ELISA, positive antibody 
was considered useful for detection of TI, TR, or BoHV-
1 seropositive cattle, but not PI animals. For the sen-
sitivity and specificity of the ELISAs, values reported 
by Hanon et al. (2018) and Raaperi et al. (2014) were 
used for the detection of BVDV and BoHV-1 antibod-
ies, respectively. For the detection of PI antigen, the 
values for the ELISA antigen as reported by Mars and 
Van Maanen (2005) were used (Table 1). The prob-
ability that one infected animal yielded a false-negative 
result was calculated based on equation [4] (Appendix 
Table A2). Therefore, the probability that at least one 
infected animal was present in the batch of animals and 
the probability that at least one infected animal was 
purchased from at least one of the farms from which 
animals could be introduced were calculated using 
equations [5.1] and [5.2] (Appendix Table A2).
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Figure 1. Pathway for bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and bovine herpesvirus-1 (BHV-1) introduction in dairy cattle herds through the 
purchase of animals; Q = quarantine; T = test on quarantine; R = quarantine routines; PI = persistently infected with BVDV; AcI = acutely 
infected with BHV-1; FN = false negative.
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Probability of Infection During Transport  
from an Infected Animal
Uninfected cattle could be infected during trans-
port by sharing the transport vehicle either with a PI 
(for BVDV) or AcI (for BoHV-1) animal or by being 
transported in a contaminated vehicle. We excluded TI 
animals because the probability of transmission from a 
TI is very low (Table 1). The likelihood of contact with 
other cattle during the transport was obtained from the 
biosecurity questionnaires. Unfortunately, data on the 
number of farms attended by the same vehicle per day 
in the country/area of origin and the average number of 
animals transported in each movement were not avail-
able. Thus, based on group discussion with attending 
veterinarians, the maximum capacity of the vehicle was 
36 animals, and several farms visited in each country/
area of origin ranging between 2 and 4 was considered. 
Therefore, the number of animals loaded by farm would 
be between 18 (in the case of 2 origins) and 9 (in the 
case of 4 origins). Equations [6.1] and [6.2] were used to 
calculate the probability of sharing a transport vehicle 
with a PI or AcI animal when purchasing animals from 
a country/area (Appendix Table A2).
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Table 1. Input parameters, distribution, and values to estimate the probability of introduction to bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and 
bovine herpesvirus 1 (BoHV-1) in study farms
Parameter  Distribution and values  Reference
BVDV     
 Herd prevalence in France  Uniform (0.21–0.22)  Santman Berends et al., 2017
 Herd prevalence in the Netherlands  Uniform (0.16–0.18)  van Duijn et al., 2019, Santman-Berends et 
al., 2015
 Herd prevalence in Spain  Uniform (0.26–0.71)  Foddai et al., 2014; Gómez-Pacheco et al., 
2009
 Herd prevalence in Catalonia  Uniform (0.54–0.57)  Benavides et al., 2018
 Herd prevalence in Galicia  Uniform (0.03–0.16)  Benavides et al., 2018
 Viremic animal  Uniform (0.022–0.029)  Foddai et al., 2014, Meyling et al., 1990
 PI1 animal prevalence (<12 mo)  Uniform (0.0002–0.02)  Bachofen et al., 2013, Joly et al., 2005
 PI animal prevalence (12 to 24 mo)  Uniform (0.0001–0.01)  Ezanno et al., 2007
 Sensitivity of ELISA (Abs2)  Uniform (0.93–0.98)  Hanon et al., 2018
 Specificity of ELISA (Abs)  Uniform (0.94–0.99)  Hanon et al., 2018
 Sensitivity of ELISA (Ag2)  Uniform (0.97–1)  Mars and Van Maanen, 2005
 Specificity of ELISA (Ag)  Uniform (0.99–0.995)  Mars and Van Maanen, 2005
 Sensitivity of PCR  Fixed value (0.99)  Hilbe et al., 2007
 Specificity of PCR  Fixed value (1)  Hilbe et al., 2007
 Efficacy of the cleaning and disinfection  Pert (0.80–0.90–1)  Foddai et al., 2014
 Probability of surviving on rubber (boots)  Pert (0.886–0.75–0.536)  Stevens et al., 2011
 Probability of surviving on galvanized metal  Pert (0.002–0.004–0.039)  Stevens et al., 2011
 Probability of surviving on soil  Pert (0.007–0.014–0.12)  Stevens et al., 2011
 Probability of transmission from TI3 animal  Uniform (0.001–0.05)  Very low; DAFF, 2004
 Probability of transmission from a PI animal  Fixed value (0.66)  Niskanen and Lindberg, 2003
BoHV-1     
 Herd prevalence in France  Uniform (0.098–0.11)  Gache et al., 2014, GDS, 2017
 Herd prevalence in the Netherlands  Uniform (0.15–0.156)  SCOPAFF, 2018, GD Animal Health, 2018 
 Herd prevalence in Spain  Uniform (0.50–0.70)  Raaperi et al., 2014
 Herd prevalence in Catalonia  Uniform (0.27–0.57)  Benavides et al., 2018
 Herd prevalence in Galicia  Uniform (0.06–0.11)  Benavides et al., 2018
 Infected animal (<24 mo)  Uniform (0.15–0.20)  Santman Berends et al., 2018
 Infected animal (>24 mo)  Uniform (0.53–0.58)  Santman Berends et al., 2018
 Sensitivity of ELISA (Abs)  Uniform (0.72–0.927)  Raaperi et al., 2014
 Specificity of ELISA (Abs)  Uniform (0.92–1)  Raaperi et al., 2014
 Efficacy of the cleaning and disinfection  Uniform (0.95–1)  Nandi et al., 2009
 Probability of transmission from AcI3 animal  Pert (0.1–0.15–0.2)  Mars et al., 2000
 Probability of reactivation of LI3 animal  Fixed value (0.07)  Vonk Noordegraaf et al.,1998
Animal transport     
 Visited farms in each country/area  Uniform (2–4)  Expert opinion
 Loaded animals in each farm  Uniform (9–18)  Expert opinion
 Loaded animals in own/farm-share vehicles  Fixed value (4)  Expert opinion
Probability of cleaning/disinfection of transport vehicle     
 France  Uniform (0.4–0.6)  Expert opinion
 The Netherlands  Uniform (0.9–0.95)  Expert opinion
 Catalonia, Galicia, and other parts of Spain  Uniform (0.05–0.1)  Expert opinion
1PI = persistently infected; on average, half of the PI animals die before 1 yr of age.
2Abs = antibodies; Ag = antigen.
3TI = transiently infected; AcI = acutely infected; LI = latently infected.
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We assumed that if purchased animals shared the 
same transport vehicle with PI or AcI animals, the 
probability of infection was 100%, similar to that in a 
model reported by Santman-Berends et al. (2017). In 
the case of BVDV, infection during transport would 
yield a TI animal, except for pregnant animals between 
30 and 120 d of gestation. In this case, infection during 
transport could yield a TR cow.
The probability that at least one uninfected (healthy) 
purchased animal of some age group yielded an infec-
tion status due to sharing a transport vehicle with a PI 
or AcI animal from each country/area was estimated 
using equation [7] (Appendix Table A2). In the case 
of BoHV-1, we considered that animals greater or less 
than 24 mo would have the same probability of be-
ing infected; thus, the age group calculation was not 
included. An active infection of 1% of the BoHV-1 
seropositive animals was assumed based on Santman-
Berends et al. (2018). Finally, we calculated the prob-
ability of being infected by considering the number of 
farms from which animals could be introduced.
Probability of Infection by Being Transported  
in a Contaminated Vehicle
The probability that at least one uninfected animal 
was infected due to being transported in a vehicle com-
ing from some country and developing an infectious 
status was calculated using equation [8] (Appendix 
Table A2). In this equation, the following parameters 
were included: (1) the probability of cleaning and disin-
fecting the vehicle between transports, obtained in the 
group discussion with the field veterinarians, by the 
opinion of personnel working in the official veterinary 
services, and from the biosecurity questionnaires; (2) 
the efficacy of the cleaning and disinfection for BVDV 
as reported by Foddai et al. (2014) and for BoHV-1 
based on descriptions reported by Nandi et al. (2009); 
and (3) BVDV survival on different surfaces reported 
by Stevens et al. (2011) (Appendix Table A3). We as-
sumed that the time interval between transports had 
a minimum of 4 h, a most probable value of 12 h, and 
a maximum of 24 h. These values were based on input 
from the veterinarians involved in the study. Survival 
of BoHV-1 was not included in the calculation because 
we considered that it can survive the whole duration 
of transport. Finally, the probability of infection of 
a susceptible animal on a contaminated surface was 
based on results from Niskanen and Lindberg (2003), 
who conducted an experiment in which 3 animals en-
tered a pen where a PI had been previously, and 2 
were infected. For BoHV-1, a value of daily aerogenic 
transmission of 0.15 between an infectious animal and 
another susceptible animal at a distance of 4 m, as 
reported by Mars et al. (2000), was used as a proxy of 
indirect transmission.
The probability of purchasing at least one PI, TI, 
TR, or BoHV-1 seropositive animal was calculated by 
summing the probability of purchasing infected animals 
at origin and the probability of infection during trans-
port.
Risk Mitigation Based on Biosecurity Measures 
Implemented on the Farm
Before estimating the reduction in probability aris-
ing from the implementation of biosecurity measures 
on the farm, we estimated the probability that one 
animal from the purchased batch was a PI, TI, TR, 
or BoHV-1 seropositive animal, considering the total 
number of animals of each age group introduced using 
a similar approach to that in equation [3.1] (Appendix 
Table A2). The following biosecurity measures were 
considered in the model.
Quarantine Period. Transiently infected animals 
would be infectious for up to 18 d (Santman-Berends et 
al., 2017) and would take between 2 and 4 d to become 
infectious (Muylkens et al., 2007). Thus, a duration of 
>24 d would reduce the probability of introduction to a 
negligible value. For PI, TR, and BoHV-1 seropositive 
cattle, we did not consider the quarantine period. In 
addition, if the quarantine lasted <24 d, the probabil-
ity of indirect transmission was estimated proportional 
to the duration (i.e., shorter durations would have a 
higher risk than longer durations). If tests were used in 
the quarantine, the probability that an animal yielded 
a false-negative result was calculated using an equation 
similar to equation [4] (Appendix Table A2).
Quarantine Routines. If farmers or farm workers 
were not taking care of quarantined animals at the end 
of the working day (i.e., last job/inspection duty of 
the day), the possibility of indirect transmission by 
fomites (i.e., boots) due to movement of farm workers 
was also considered. The impact of this measure was 
estimated by multiplying the probability that the TI 
or PI animal yielded a false-negative result with the 
survival probability of BVDV on rubber (i.e., boots) 
and the probability of indirect transmission (Table 1). 
The time interval between visiting the quarantine and 
the rest of the farm was about 2 h (with a minimum of 
1 h and a maximum of 4 h) according to field veterinar-
ian opinion.
As a proxy for the probability of indirect transmis-
sion, the value reported in the experiment conducted 
by Niskanen and Lindberg (2003) for BVDV and that 
conducted by Mars et al. (2000) for BoHV-1 was used. 
In the case of TI animals, considering that they inter-
mittently eliminate a low amount of virus (Lindberg 
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and Houe, 2005; Sarrazin et al., 2014b), the probabil-
ity of transmission should be very low (Table 1). A 
quantitative estimate for this probability was obtained 
following the semiquantitative methodology for import 
risk analysis described by the Department of Agricul-
ture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF, 2004). In the case 
of BoHV-1, a proportion of seropositive animals that 
could excrete the virus during quarantine due to the 
stress of transportation was considered. According to 
Vonk Noordegraaf et al. (1998), 7% of the seroposi-
tive cows could have a reactivated infection and excrete 
virus after the transport.
Number of Purchased Cattle
Finally, the annual probability of infection with 
BVDV or BoHV-1 due to purchasing animals was calcu-
lated by considering the number of animals introduced 
in each batch and the number of times animals were 
introduced in a 12-mo period from each country/area. 
Therefore, the annual probability of BVDV or BoHV-1 
infection in each study farm due to purchasing animals 
was calculated following equation [9] (Appendix Table 
A2).
Movements to Cattle Competitions
Some study farms moved cattle to national or region-
al competitions. To participate in these competitions, 
animals must be certified as having tested negative for 
BoHV-1 antibodies and BVDV antigen. Therefore, for 
BVDV, the probability that false-negative PI or TI 
animals could attend a competition would be negligible 
(as the sensitivity of antigen detection test is close to 
100%). Thus, we decided to only include this scenario 
in the pathway for BoHV-1.
From the movement database, we extracted the num-
ber of movements to cattle competitions and the age 
of moved animals. Herd prevalence was assumed to be 
that of the region where the study farm was located 
(i.e., Galicia or Catalonia). Movement to competitions 
was assumed to be carried out using external vehicles 
(from a company) based on discussion with field veteri-
narians. For BVDV and BoHV-1, a similar approach to 
equation [8] (Appendix Table A2) was used to calculate 
the probability that animals transported to a competi-
tion were infected in a contaminated transport vehicle. 
In this case, animals in a transport vehicle could have 
1 or 2 origins, and the maximum number of individuals 
loaded per farm was considered to be 4.
For BoHV-1, the probability that the animals shared 
the same vehicle with false-negative AcI animals or had 
direct or indirect contact with false-negative AcI ani-
mals at competition was calculated using a similar ap-
proach to equation [7] (Appendix Table A2). Animals 
returning from the competition could enter directly 
into the farm or be quarantined. These data were ob-
tained from the biosecurity questionnaires to calculate 
the probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 infection after 
implementation of biosecurity measures as previously 
described.
Reared Replacement Heifers Offsite
Some study farms bred their own replacements offsite 
from the milking or lactating cattle farm. The number 
of these movements and age of moved animals were 
obtained from the movements database; calculations 
were performed using a similar approach to equation [8] 
(Appendix Table A2). When the movement was carried 
out using the farm’s own vehicle, transport was consid-
ered to be shared with only one other farm, loading a 
maximum of 4 heifers. Risk mitigation derived from the 
quarantine was calculated as previously described. If 
heifers were reared in a multi-origin farm, these move-
ments were considered as if they were from a different 
origin. Therefore, calculations described in the pathway 
for the introduction of reared replacement heifers’ off-
site were performed using similar approach to equation 
[9] (Appendix Table A2).
Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was performed to evaluate the 
influence of uncertainty of input parameters in the 
model output for all study farms. The Spearman cor-
relation coefficient was selected for these calculations. 
In addition, in all farms, 3 uncertain input parameters 
were tested. The first parameter was herd prevalence 
and prevalence of infected animals; the second param-
eter was the number of visited farms in each country/
area and loaded animals in each farm. For the sensitiv-
ity analysis, both parameters were reduced to half of 
the values used as default. The third parameter was the 
probability of cleaning and disinfection of the transport 
vehicle, with a range of 90% to 95%, being higher than 
default value.
Risk-Mitigating Strategies
The effect of some biosecurity measures—quarantine, 
testing on origin farm, and transport—on the probabil-
ity of introducing BVD or IBR was evaluated in a se-
lected farm, as follows. (1) Quarantine fulfills following 
conditions: testing cattle on arrival, duration period of 
at least 24 d, and quarantine is visited at the end of the 
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workday. For BoHV-1, we considered a higher value for 
sensitivity and specificity of ELISA antibodies equal to 
98.41 and 99.76%, respectively (Bertolotti et al., 2015). 
(2) Test in origin: All purchased animals are tested be-
fore entering the farm. As previously described, higher 
sensitivity values were assumed for BoHV-1 ELISA. 
(3) Transport vehicle is not shared with animals from 
another farm. Figure 6 shows the effect of these risk-
mitigating strategies.
RESULTS
Animal Movements and Biosecurity Measures
Among 127 study farms, 46 farms that moved cattle 
during 2017 were included in the risk assessment model. 
A description of cattle movements (number of entrances, 
number of purchased cattle, origin, age, other factors) 
by study farms is shown in Table 2. Cattle transport 
was carried out mainly using vehicles from an external 
company, and several farms shared transport vehicles 
with cattle from other farms (Table 3).
Of the 36 farms that purchased animals, 50 and 39% 
tested the animals for BVDV and BoHV-1 at the origin 
farm, respectively, before transportation. Eight out of 
36 farms had quarantine facilities, and 5 farms tested 
animals in the quarantine for both diseases. Among the 
8 farms with quarantine facilities, workers visited the 
quarantine at the end of the workday on 6 farms, and 
the quarantine duration was >24 d on 7 farms. Among 
farms with cattle returning from competitions, only 
one farm placed animals in quarantine facilities. Of 
movements made with farm-owned transports, 5 (55%) 
cleaned and disinfected vehicles after being used.
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Table 2. Description of animal movements in study farms
Origin of purchased animals No. of farms1 Minimum Median Maximum Total
 No. of cattle introduced/purchased per farm  
 France 11 1 1 14 29
 The Netherlands 6 1 1 2 6
 Catalonia 12 1 3 16 65
 Galicia 15 1 2 6 44
 Rest of Spain 4 1 3 15 22
No. of origins per group of cattle purchased   
 France 11 1 3 10 42
 The Netherlands 6 1 1 1 5
 Catalonia 12 1 2 24 44
 Galicia 15 1 1 3 24
 Rest of Spain 4 1 1 3 6
Total no. of animals purchased   
 France 11 1 8 541 687
 The Netherlands 6 1 9 42 90
 Catalonia 12 1 14 169 418
 Galicia 15 2 4 40 108
 Rest of Spain 4 2 8 96 113
Age of animals (mo)   
 <12 15 2 6 7 113
 12 to 24 22 1 2 81 325
 >24 39 1 6 537 978
Movements of reared replacement heifers offsite   
 Number 15 1 11 28 176
 Heifers moved  14 134 357 1,962
Movements to competitions     
 Number 8 1 2 2 13
 Cattle moved  1 2 6 27
1Some farms purchased cattle from more than one location. Thus, the sum of farms is higher than the number of study farms (n = 46).
Table 3. Characteristics of transport vehicles used for animal movements in study farms
Type of movement
No. of farms that use 
own transport vehicle
No. of farms that use 
vehicles from external company
Purchase of cattle 2 (0)1 34 (20)
Reared replacement heifers offsite 9 (1) 6 (5)
Cattle competitions 0 8 (8)
1Values in parentheses show the number of farms that shared transport vehicles with cattle from other farms.
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Probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 Introduction 
Through Animal Movements at the Farm Level
The model calculated the probability of virus intro-
duction for each farm according to their characteristics. 
As an example, model results from one selected farm, 
together with the number of movements and biosecu-
rity measures of that farm, are shown in Figure 2 and 
Table 4. The selected farm (Table 4) purchased cattle 
from Catalonia and other regions of Spain, attended 
cattle competitions, and reared replacement heifers 
offsite. All movements corresponded to nonpregnant 
cattle. The risk assessment model estimated that the 
farm had a high annual probability of introduction of 
BVDV and BoHV-1, with median values of 75 and 62%, 
respectively. The purchase of cattle from other regions 
of Spain was the route with higher probability values 
for both diseases, whereas movements to cattle com-
petitions, reared heifers offsite, and purchase of cattle 
from other farms in Catalonia were higher for BVDV 
only. Based on model results, the farm had a negligible 
probability of purchasing PI or TR animals (Figure 3).
As shown in Table 4, different biosecurity measures 
could be implemented to reduce the probability of 
introducing BVDV or BoHV-1 infected animals into 
the selected farm. The purchase of new animals was 
conducted without any testing before movement and, 
more importantly, they were transported in a shared 
transport vehicle with cattle from other farms and 
loaded onto the farm without being quarantined. 
Reared replacement heifers offsite had no contact with 
other animals. However, transportation took place with 
an own-farm vehicle that was used for other farms’ 
movements, without cleaning and disinfection after 
each transportation.
Probability of BVDV and BoHV-1 Introduction  
in the 46 Dairy Farms Analyzed
Figure 4 shows the distribution of median probability 
values for the 46 study farms. The annual probability 
of introducing BVDV or BoHV-1 infected animals was 
very heterogeneous, being close to 0 in some farms 
and close to 1 in others (Figure 4a, d). In 23 farms, 
the median probability of BVDV introduction was 
≤12% (first quartile = 1.2%; third quartile = 28%). 
The median probability of BoHV-1 introduction was 
<9% (first quartile = 3%; third quartile = 23%). Farms 
that purchased cattle from their same region (i.e., local 
movements) had a higher probability for introduction of 
BVDV and BoHV-1, followed by farms that introduced 
animals from other regions of Europe, reared replace-
ment heifers offsite, or showed cattle in competitions 
(Figure 4a, d).
Sharing transport vehicles with other farms resulted 
in a higher probability of infection for most study farms, 
followed by transport of animals in contaminated vehi-
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Figure 2. Probability distribution of bovine viral diarrhea (BVD) 
and infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR) introduction for each 
movement performed by selected farm. Model results for (a) BVD 
and (b) IBR. T = total probability; Co = probability of introduction 
through cattle competitions; R = reared replacement heifers offsite; S 
= purchase of cattle from Spain; G = purchase of cattle from Galicia; 
C = purchase of cattle from Catalonia; N = purchase of cattle from 
the Netherlands; F = purchase of cattle from France. (c) Number and 
type of movements: number of cattle movements from France (F), 
the Netherlands (N), Catalonia (C), Galicia (G), and Spain (S); R = 
replacement movements, and Co = movements to competitions. Boxes 
indicate first quartile, median, and third quartile; whiskers indicate 
minimum and maximum.
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cles. The contribution of purchasing animals infected at 
origin was low for most study farms in the case of BVD 
but not IBR (Figure 4c, e). As regards BVDV infection 
status, in most farms, the highest probability resulted 
from the introduction of TI animals (Figure 4b).
Sensitivity Analysis
The Spearman correlation coefficient was close to 
zero in all farms for different input parameters (range 
from −0.04 to 0.03). Therefore, uncertainty in input 
parameters did not affect model results. However, the 
model results were sensitive to alterations in number of 
visited farms, number of loaded animals, herd preva-
lence, prevalence of infected animals, and probability 
of cleaning/disinfection of animal transport vehicle. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of median probability 
values for the 46 study farms to alternative values to 
those parameters. Prevalence of infected herds and in-
fected animals had greater influence in model results.
Risk-Mitigating Strategies
Effects of risk-mitigating strategies are shown in 
Figure 6. When a selected farm met expectations de-
scribed for quarantine, there was a notable reduction 
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Table 4. Analyzed variables for one randomly selected farm1
Item
Age (mo) of animals
Origins Movements  
Test in 
origin  Vehicle  ST2  Q3<12 12–24 >24
Catalonia 0 1 0 1 1 No External company Yes No
Other regions of Spain 0 0 2 1 1 No External company Yes No
Competitions 0 0 7 NA4 2 Yes External company Yes No
External replacement 71 0 0 1 12 No Own-farmed No5 No
1All introduced/purchased cattle were nonpregnant animals.
2ST = shared transport.
3Q = quarantine.
4Not applicable.
5The vehicle was not cleaned and disinfected after animals were unloaded.
Figure 3. Probability of bovine viral diarrhea introduction in a selected farm due to movements of animals within Catalonia and rest of 
Spain, replacement heifers, and competitions. TR = probability of Trojan cow (pregnant cow carrying a PI calf) introduction; TI = probability 
of transiently infected cattle introduction; PI = probability of persistently infected cattle introduction. Boxes indicate first quartile, median, and 
third quartile; whiskers indicate minimum and maximum.
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in the probability of introducing BVDV and BoHV-1 
(<15%). Not sharing transport with cattle from other 
farms had a great influence in the probability of BVDV 
and BoHV-1 introduction, decreasing to 30 and 45%, 
respectively. In contrast, testing all purchased animals 
at origin had a low effect in the probability of disease 
introduction for BVDV.
DISCUSSION
The risk assessment model showed that several farms 
had a high annual probability of introduction of BVDV 
and BoHV-1. Farms that purchased cattle from within 
their region (i.e., local movements) and shared trans-
port with other farms had the higher probability for 
BVDV and BoHV-1 introduction. These results dem-
onstrate that biosecurity practices should be improved 
in dairy farms from Spain.
Quantitative risk assessment models can provide an 
accurate estimate of the probability of virus introduc-
tion, as they consider those factors that influence the 
likelihood of disease transmission, such as the survival 
of the virus in the environment, amount of pathogen 
excreted, frequency of contacts, biosecurity measures, 
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Figure 4. Distribution of median probability values of bovine viral diarrhea (BVD; a, b, c) and infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR; d, 
e) introduction of all study farms. (a, d) Probability of BVD or IBR introduction by cattle competitions (Compet); reared replacement heifers 
offsite (Repl); France, Spain, and the Netherlands movements (NoLoc); Catalonia and Galicia movements (Local); and total by animal move-
ments (Total). (b) Probability of BVD introduction by type: Trojan cows (TR, pregnant cow carrying a PI calf); transiently infected cattle (TI); 
and persistently infected cattle (PI). (c, e) Probability of BVD or IBR introduction by origin or transport: transport of cattle in contaminated 
vehicles (CT); share of transport vehicles with other farms (ST); and animal infected in origin (Or). Boxes indicate first quartile, median, and 
third quartile; whiskers indicate minimum and maximum; and circles indicate outliers.
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and other factors that can modify the probability of 
transmission for a given contact. Consequently, these 
kinds of models have a higher degree of complexity and 
need quantitative data that are not always available. 
Most of the developed models that measure biosecurity 
at the farm level in cattle and other species have been 
based only on opinions and perceptions and do not pro-
vide an estimate of probability of disease introduction 
(Julio Pinto and Urcelay, 2003; Holtkamp et al., 2013; 
Laanen et al., 2013; Allepuz et al., 2018). Such models 
can be very useful as educational tools, for develop-
ing skills in risk-based prioritization, and increasing 
awareness (Sternberg-Lewerin et al., 2015), as well as to 
benchmark farms in relation to their biosecurity level 
(Dewulf and van Immerseel, 2018). However, they can-
not be used to assess probability of virus introduction 
or to identify measures that should be prioritized based 
on their impact on that probability.
The use of quantitative risk assessment models can 
be useful to promote the improvement of biosecurity 
in dairy cattle farms and support disease control pro-
grams. However, complexity and lack of understanding 
of the logic behind development of quantitative risk 
analysis models by end-users (e.g., field veterinarians) 
hampers use of these models in practice, and therefore 
limits their effects in improving biosecurity or support-
ing disease control programs. We tried to overcome 
this issue by using a participative approach with the 
objective of developing a risk assessment tool that 
could be adapted to end-user needs. To that end, we 
invited field veterinarians to identify input parameters 
of the model, obtain some data (e.g., that related to 
animal transport practices), and evaluate the reliabil-
ity of the obtained results. Successful implementation 
of biosecurity programs requires the participation of 
farmers, industry, and veterinarians (Barkema et al., 
2015), so further efforts to discuss model results and, 
if needed, to incorporate suggested modifications with 
these stakeholders would be of paramount importance 
to improve biosecurity.
A parameter with a high degree of uncertainty was 
BVDV and BoHV-1 herd prevalence in Spain. We com-
bined reported data in several epidemiological studies 
to consider differences between places with or without 
voluntary control programs for both diseases. Current-
ly, in Spain, BVDV and BoHV-1 control programs are 
voluntary, and only implemented in some regions. In 
fact, in Galicia (northwestern Spain), the program for 
both diseases is voluntary (Lindberg et al., 2006; Eiras 
et al., 2009). However, since September 2019, a volun-
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Figure 5. Distribution of median probability values of all study farms of bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVD_S) and infectious bovine rhino-
tracheitis (IBR_S) introduction with alternative values. I = initial probability of introduction with default values; Prev = lower herd prevalence 
and infected animals’ prevalence (i.e., half of default values); Trans = lower number of farms visited in each country/area and lower number of 
animals loaded in each farm (i.e., half of default values); C-D = higher probability of cleaning/disinfection of transport vehicle (i.e., range of 
90 to 95%). Boxes indicate first quartile, median, and third quartile; whiskers indicate minimum and maximum; and circles indicate outliers.
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tary control program for BoHV-1 has been created in 
Spain (Royal Decree 554/2019; BOE, 2019). Because of 
the lack of recent studies on herd prevalence in different 
regions of Spain, this parameter ranged between 26 and 
71%. Consequently, the probability of virus introduc-
tion through this route had a very wide distribution. 
Reducing uncertainty around the herd prevalence of 
BVDV and BoHV-1 infected herds would help increase 
the accuracy of the model results.
In relation to cattle transport, we had information 
only on moved animals but no specific information 
about routines of the cattle transport vehicle (e.g., 
number of farms visited per day, number of animals 
by transport vehicle). Lack of availability of this data 
is common in other countries in Europe, as reported 
previously in other studies (Bronsvoort et al., 2008; 
Santman-Berends et al., 2018). Consequently, in this 
study, the information was obtained through discus-
sions held with attending veterinarians. The sensitivity 
analysis demonstrated that variation in these param-
eters influenced the model results. Therefore, incorpo-
ration of data from animal transport companies in the 
risk assessment model would increase the accuracy of 
the estimations.
Interestingly, model results highlighted the important 
role of the animal transport vehicles in the spread of 
these viruses between dairy cattle farms, especially in 
the case of local movements when purchasing replace-
ment heifers. In addition, testing animals at origin did 
not have a great influence in reducing the probability 
of disease introduction, as shown in the analysis con-
ducted on one selected farm. This lack of efficiency was 
also related to the role of animal transport, because 
negative animals at origin could become infected dur-
ing transport. On the one hand, as a voluntary control 
program for both diseases, there are no legal require-
ments to transport cattle in relation to their health 
status. On the other hand, cleaning and disinfection 
of transport vehicles is compulsory but the efficacy is 
probably low, and sometimes not applied. Efforts to 
develop more adequate disinfection points within Spain 
and more rigorous monitoring would be beneficial in re-
ducing the probability of disease transmission through 
contaminated vehicles, as demonstrated by previous 
studies that include international transport (Brons-
voort et al., 2008; Fountain et al., 2018). Furthermore, 
animal transports in which cattle from different farms 
were mixed was quite common and increased the prob-
ability of disease introduction in several farms. The low 
number of animals moved by some farms hampers the 
possibility of not mixing due to economic reasons. Fur-
ther discussion is needed to evaluate how this practice 
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Figure 6. Reduction in probability of bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVD_R) and infectious bovine rhinotracheitis (IBR_R) introduction by 
implementation of biosecurity measures in selected farm. I = initial probability of introduction with default values; Q = quarantine; Q + Se = 
quarantine and higher sensitivity of antibody ELISA; T = test in origin; T + Se = test in origin using antibody ELISA with higher sensitivity; 
NS = animal transport vehicle not shared with other farms. Boxes indicate first quartile, median, and third quartile; whiskers indicate minimum 
and maximum.
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could be reduced without compromising the viability of 
transport companies.
In the model, we assumed that all animals that shared 
transport vehicle with a PI or AcI animal became in-
fected. This represents a worst-case situation because 
the limited duration of transport does not necessarily 
result in all cattle being infected by the PI or AcI ani-
mal. First, efficient transmission of BVDV from acutely 
infected animals may require exposure to higher viral 
loads or for a longer period (Falkenberg et al., 2018). 
Second, in BoHV-1 infections, latently infected animals 
can reactivate due to transportation stress, posing a 
similar risk to that of AcI animals. In addition, trans-
port periods less than 8 h represent a short period in 
which to become infected and then progress to the 
subsequent infectious status (Santman-Berends et al., 
2018). In the model, we assumed the duration of animal 
transport was not enough for reactivation and we only 
considered it during quarantine.
Participation in competitions did not represent a 
significant probability of disease introduction for most 
of the farms attending competitions, similar to the 
situation in Denmark for participation in international 
competitions (Foddai et al., 2014). The exception could 
be in relation to BVDV when sending pregnant cattle 
between 30 and 120 d of gestation to these competitions. 
Therefore, the probability of introducing TR cattle due 
to movements to cattle competitions could be avoided 
simply by not sending pregnant cattle to competitions. 
However, some researchers have found that allowing 
cattle to return to the farm after competitions is a 
risk factor for the introduction of BoHV-1 and BVDV 
(van Wuijckhuise et al., 1998; Houe, 1999). For BoHV-
1, the gathering of large numbers of cattle is a stress 
factor that could result in virus reactivation, and the 
overcrowded barn would facilitate spread of infectious 
diseases. Moreover, cattle returning to farm of origin 
could infect other cattle on the farm (van Schaik et al., 
1999). Nevertheless, compulsory testing of all animals 
attending cattle competitions reduced the probability 
of disease introduction by this route, with the vehicle 
for animal transport again being the most critical point 
to be infected.
This study had some limitations. First, the participa-
tion of farms was voluntary, so our sample was not fully 
representative of dairy farms in Spain. However, in this 
study, we intended to develop a risk assessment model 
to improve biosecurity rather than providing an esti-
mate of the probability of disease introduction in dairy 
farms from these areas. Second, only one experimental 
study (Niskanen and Lindberg 2003) was available for 
the probability of indirect transmission of BVDV (i.e., 
infection due to contact with contaminated surfaces). 
In addition, to our knowledge, there are no studies for 
BoHV-1 on the probability of indirect transmission 
and survival of virus in different materials. The virus 
is stable for 1 mo at 4°C, can be inactivated at 37°C 
within 10 d and at 22°C within 50 d, and may survive 
for more than 30 d in foodstuffs (Nandi et al., 2009). 
Thus, based on reported resistance in the environment, 
we assumed that the virus would survive between 
movements. In the same way, we did not find data on 
efficacy of cleaning and disinfection for BoHV-1 and, 
based on the virus characteristics described by Straub 
(1990), we assumed that efficacy of conventional disin-
fectants was high. Further studies analyzing how these 
viruses are transmitted would be beneficial to develop 
more accurate models.
In the studied farms, the probability of introducing 
BVDV and BoHV-1 could be reduced by the implemen-
tation of biosecurity measures. Despite the inherent 
limitations of the developed model, we believe that the 
model is a useful tool that supports decision-making 
on which biosecurity measures should be prioritized in 
dairy cattle herds to reduce the probability of introduc-
tion of these viruses. Further efforts should be made to 
estimate the probability of virus introduction through 
other routes, such as movement of people, non-animal 
transport, and so on, to obtain a complete scenario for 
each farm.
CONCLUSIONS
The quantitative risk assessment tool developed here 
allows biosecurity measures to be prioritized at the 
farm level based on the probability of the introduction 
of BVDV and BoHV-1 through cattle movements and 
the effect of these biosecurity measures on such prob-
ability. This approach can support decision-making in 
the development of biosecurity programs according to 
farm-specific risks. The model demonstrated the high 
probability of introduction of these viruses in some 
farms, especially through animal transport. Efforts 
should be devoted to reviewing animal transport prac-
tices to reduce this probability.
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Figure A1. Pathway of entrance according to types that reared replacement heifers offsite. Shared/not shared: when place to rear heifers 
is shared or not with animals of other farms; PI = persistently infected with bovine viral diarrhea virus; AcI = acutely infected with bovine 
herpesvirus-1; Q = quarantine; T = test on quarantine; R = quarantine routines; FN = false negative.
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Figure A2. Pathway of entrance according to the scenarios considered for movements to cattle competitions; AcI = acutely infected with 
bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1); Q = quarantine; T = test on quarantine; R = quarantine routines; FN = false negative; BVDV = bovine viral 
diarrhea virus.




No. of dairy 
farms advised
Animal health, reproduction, and bovine clinic 40 25
Animal health, reproduction, and technical management 15 22
Animal health and reproduction 4 15
Animal health and reproduction 28 26
Animal health, reproduction, and milk quality 20 20
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Table A2. Equations used to estimate probabilities inside the model to evaluate the probability of bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) and 
bovine herpesvirus-1 (BoHV-1) introduction in a dairy farm1
Equation  Description
Probability of purchasing an infected animal  
 [1] Number of animals purchased each time from country/area i and age group k: 
 
 n i k




( ) = ( ) ( )
( )
• animals(i, k): number of animals purchased throughout the 
year from country/area i of group age k per farm 
• times(i): number of times animals have been purchased from 
country/area i in 1 yr 
• farms(i): number of farms from which animals can be 
purchased in each country/area i
 [2] Probability that at least one animal from a batch coming from a single farm of 
a certain country/area i was already infected with BVDV or BoHV-1 j (j indicating 
whether the animal was a PI, TI, TR, or BoHV-1 seropositive animal):
 P i j HerdPrev i WithinPrevinf
n i k gest i
,
,( ) = − − ( )× 




• HerdPrev(i): herd prevalence in country/area i. 
• WithinPrev: proportion of seropositive (BoHV-1) and viremic 
(BVDV) animals 
• gest(i): proportion of pregnant animals imported from country/
area i (this parameter was only used for BVDV calculations and 
in the case of animals >12 mo)
 [3.1] Probability that a single animal was infected: 
 
 P i j P i jinf Animal inf n
i k gest i
_
,
, ,( ) = − − ( ) 





 [3.2] Expected number of BVDV and BoHV-1 animals already infected in the farm of 
origin: 
 Animals Infected i j P i j n i k gest iinf Animal_   ,      ,  , _( )= ( )× ( )× ( )
      
Probability of false negatives       
 [4] Probability that one infected animal yielded a false-negative result:
 P i j
P i j Se










( )× −( )




 + × − ( )( )


Sp P i jinf Animal1 _ ,
• Pinf_Animal: probability that a single animal was infected 
• Se: sensitivity 
• Sp: specificity
 
 [5.1] Probability that at least one infected animal was present in the batch of 
animals: 
 P i j P i jFN batch FN
Animals Infected i j
_
_ ,
, ,( ) = − − ( ) 
( )
1 1
• PFN: probability that one infected animal yielded a false-
negative result 
• Animals_Infected: expected number of BVDV and BoHV-1 
animals already infected in the farm of origin
 [5.2] Probability that at least one infected animal was purchased from at least one of 
the farms from which animals could be introduced:
P i j P i jinf batch FN batch
farms i





• PFN_batch: probability that at least one infected animal was 
present in the batch of animals
Probability of infection during transport       
 [6.1] Probability of sharing a transport vehicle with at least one PI or AcI animal in 
country/area i:
 P i HerdPrev i WithinPrev i P or Pshare AcI PI( ) = ( )× − − ( )×( ) 1 1 { }
loaded
• PAcI: probability of an active infection in a group of BoHV-1 
seropositive animals 
• PPI: probability of PI animal 
• loaded: number of animals loaded by farm
 [6.2] Probability of sharing a transport vehicle with a PI or AcI animal when 
purchasing animals from country/area i:
 P i P iI V share
Visited
_ ( ) = − − ( ) 1 1
• Pshare: probability of sharing a transport vehicle with at least 
one PI or AcI animal in country/area i 
• Visited: number of farms visited by country/area
 [7] Probability that at least one uninfected purchased animal of the age group k yielded 
an infection status j due to sharing transport vehicle with a PI or AcI animal from each 
country/area i:
 P i j P iBVD I V




( ) = − − ( )


( )× ( ) 1 1   
 
 P i P iIBR I V
healthy i
Shared





• PI_V: probability of sharing a transport vehicle with a PI or 
AcI animal when purchasing animals from country/area i 
• healthy: uninfected purchased animal 
• gest(i): proportion of pregnant animals imported
Probability of infection due to being transported in a contaminated vehicle       
 [8] Probability that at least one uninfected animal was infected due to being 




P i C i E S PT P i C i
I C








• PI_V: probability of sharing a transport vehicle with a PI or 
AcI animal when purchasing animals from country/area i 
• C: probability of cleaning and disinfecting the vehicle between 
transports in country/area i 
• E: efficacy of the cleaning and disinfection 
• S: survival of BVDV in metal 
• PT: probability of infection of a susceptible animal in a 
contaminated surface
Annual probability of infection by BVDV or BoHV-1 due to purchasing animals:       
 [9] 






_ = − − ( )  × − ( )  ×
= = =







1∏ − ( ) TR iY  
 
 P IBR iIBR Purchase
i







• PIY: annual probability of purchasing at least one PI 
• TIY: annual probability of purchasing at least one TI 
• TRY: annual probability of purchasing at least one TR 
• IBRPos_Y: annual probability of purchasing at least one TR
1PI = persistently infected animal; TI = transiently infected animal; TR = Trojan cow (pregnant cow carrying a PI calf); AcI = acutely infected animal.
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Table A3. Probability (%) of bovine viral diarrhea virus survival after application to the potential fomite
Fomite  Treatment1
Survival time
1 h 2 h 4 h 12 h 24 h
Rubber Mucus 88.6 75 53.6 10.4 5.6
Galvanized metal Mucus 21.5 9.6 3.9 0.4 0.2
Soil Mucus 47.9 26.2 12.0 1.4 0.7
1Before application to the potential fomite, the virus was diluted in PBS that included 20% synthetic mucus. 
Source: Stevens et al. (2011).
